Estruturas de Poder e Diferenciação Estatal

Jogos de Aposta e Mobilidade Urbana em Perspectiva Comparada

Abstract

This article examines the selective action of the Brazilian state in dealing with functionally similar activities operating at the boundaries between legality, informality, and regulation. Using a comparative approach, the study analyzes two pairs of cases: the historical repression of the jogo do bicho and the regulation of online sports betting, and the criminalization of informal van transportation compared to the subsequent regulation of digital ride-hailing platforms. Drawing on the literature on public policy, bureaucracy, and political economy, the article argues that the observed differences are not primarily driven by technical, legal, or moral criteria, but by power structures shaping actors’ capacity to influence decision-making processes. Methodologically, the study is based on a bibliographic and exploratory review, combining theoretical contributions with historical analyses of regulatory trajectories. The findings suggest that activities associated with actors lacking institutional influence tend to remain under selective repression and persistent illegality, whereas those linked to organized and politically connected actors are more likely to be incorporated through regulation. The article contributes to debates on state selectivity by showing how legality is politically constructed and stabilized through power asymmetries.